|
|
|
| Zobacz też: |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The Vietnam War, also known as the Second Indochina War, or the Vietnam Conflict, occurred from 1959[8] to April 30, 1975. The war was fought between the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), supported by its communist allies, and the US-supported Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).[9][10]
Throughout the conflict the less equipped and trained Vietcong fought a guerilla war and North Vietnamese soldiers fought a conventional war against US forces in the region, using the jungles of Vietnam to spring deadly ambushes whilst the United States used overwhelming firepower in artillery and aircraft to grind down offensives and potential Vietcong bases. In particular, the iconic Huey helicopters played a decisive role in air-lifting supplies and when later upgraded with rockets and machine guns took part in the heavy ground conflicts.
In 1965 the United States sent in troops to prevent the South Vietnamese government from collapsing. Ultimately, however, the United States failed to achieve its goal, and in 1975 Vietnam was reunified under Communist control; in 1976 it officially became the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. During the conflict, approximately 3 to 4 million Vietnamese on both sides were killed, in addition to another 1.5 to 2 million Lao and Cambodians who were drawn into the war.[11]
The war had a major impact in the United States; opposition to the war was greater than any other and fueled the counter-culture movement. US foreign policy changed as relations with China normalized whilst that with the Soviet Union improved somewhat with SALT talks, initiating the Cold War policy of Détente.
Various names have been applied to the conflict, and these have shifted over time, although Vietnam War is the most commonly used title in English. It has been variously called the Second Indochina War, the Vietnam Conflict, the Vietnam War. In Vietnamese, the war is commonly known as Chiến tranh Việt Nam (The Vietnam War), or more officially as Kháng chiến chống Mỹ (Resistance War against America).
The main military organizations involved in the war were, on the side of the South, the U.S. military and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), and, on the side of the North, the Vietnam People's Army (VPA), also known as the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) or the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN), and the communist guerrilla forces in the South named the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF), also known as the Viet Cong.
The communist takeover of China in 1949 revived the fortunes of the Vietminhcitation needed. In 1950, the Communists nations recognized the Vietminh's Democratic Republic of Vietnam as the government of Vietnam while non-Communist nations recognized the French-backed State of Vietnam in Saigon led by former Emperor Bao Dai.[12] Chinese weapons, expertise, and laborers would proved crucial to the Vietminh's success.
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 marked a decisive turning pointcitation needed. From the perspective of many in Washington, what had been a colonial war in Indochina was transformed into another example of communist expansionism directed by the Kremlin.[13]
In 1950, the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) arrived to screen French requests for aid, advise on strategy, and train Vietnamese soldiers.[14] By 1954, the U.S. had supplied 300,000 small arms and spent one billion dollars in support of the French military effort. The Eisenhower administration was shouldering 80 percent of the cost of the war.[15] The Viet Minh received crucial support from the Soviet Union and the PRC. Chinese support in the Border Campaign of 1950 allowed supplies to come from China into Vietnam. Throughout the conflict, U.S. intelligence estimates remained skeptical of French chances of success.[16]
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu marked the end of French involvement in Indochina. The Viet Minh and their mercurial commander Vo Nguyen Giap handed the French a stunning military defeat. On May 7, 1954, the French Union garrison surrendered. At the Geneva Conference the French negotiated a ceasefire agreement with the Viet Minh. Independence was granted to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
Vietnam was temporarily partitioned at the 17th parallel, and under the terms of the Geneva Convention, civilians were to be given the opportunity to freely move between the two provisional states. Elections throughout the country were to be held, according to the Geneva accords, but never took place. Around one million northerners, mainly Catholics, fled south, fearing persecution by the communists.[17] It is estimated that as many as two million more would have left had they not been stopped by the Viet Minh.[18] In the north, the Viet Minh established a socialist state—the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—and engaged in a land reform program in which the mass killing of perceived “class enemies” occurred. Ho Chi Minh later apologized. In the south a non-communist state was established under the Emperor Bao Dai, a former puppet of the French and the Japanese. Ngo Dinh Diem became his Prime Minister. In addition to the Catholics flowing south, up to 90,000 Viet Minh fighters went north for “regroupment” as envisioned by the Geneva Accords. However, in contravention of the Accords, the Viet Minh left roughly 5,000 to 10,000 cadres in South Vietnam as a “politico-military substructure within the object of its irredentism.”[19]
|
|
As dictated by the Geneva Conference of 1954, the partition of Vietnam was meant to be only temporary, pending national elections on July 20, 1956. Much as in Korea, the agreement stipulated that the two military zones were to be separated by a temporary demarcation line (known as the Demilitarized Zone or DMZ). The United States, alone among the great powers, refused to sign the Geneva agreement.[20] The president of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, declined to hold elections. This called into question the United States' commitment to democracy in the region, but also raised questions about the legitimacy of any election held in the communist-run North. President Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed U.S. fears when he wrote that, in 1954, “80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh” over Emperor Bao Dai.[21][22] However, this wide popularity was expressed before Ho's disastrous land reform program and a peasant revolt in Ho's home province which was bloodily suppressed.
The cornerstone of U.S. policy was the Domino Theory. This argued that if South Vietnam fell to communist forces, then all of South East Asia would follow. Popularized by the Eisenhower Administration,[23] some argued that if communism spread unchecked, it would follow them home by first reaching Hawaii and follow to the West Coast of the United States. It was better, therefore, to fight communism in Asia, rather than on American soil.[24]
Ngo Dinh Diem was chosen by the U.S. to lead South Vietnam. A devout Roman Catholic, he was fervently anti-communist and was “untainted” by any connection to the French. He was one of the few prominent Vietnamese nationalists who could claim both attributes. Historian Luu Doan Huynh notes, however, that “Diem represented narrow and extremist nationalism coupled with autocracy and nepotism.”[25]
The new American patrons were almost completely ignorant of Vietnamese culture. They knew little of the language or long history of the country.[12] There was a tendency to assign American motives to Vietnamese actions, and Diem warned that it was an illusion to believe that blindly copying Western methods would solve Vietnamese problems.[12]
In April and June 1955, Diem (against U.S. advice) cleared the decks of any political opposition by launching military operations against the Cao Dai religious sect, the Buddhist Hoa Hao, and the Binh Xuyen organized crime group (which was allied with members of the secret police and some military elements). Diem accused these groups of harboring Communist agents. As broad-based opposition to his harsh tactics mounted, Diem increasingly sought to blame the communists.[26]
Beginning in the summer of 1955, he launched the “Denounce the Communists” campaign, during which communists and other anti-government elements were arrested, imprisoned, tortured, or executed. Opponents were labeled Viet Cong by the regime to degrade their nationalist credentials. During this period refugees moved across the demarcation line in both directions. Around 52,000 Vietnamese civilians moved from south to north. However a staggering 450,000 people fled north Vietnam to the south, in aircraft and ships provided by France and the U.S.[27] CIA propaganda efforts increased the outflow with slogans such as “the Virgin Mary is going South.” The northern refugees were meant to give Diem a strong anti-communist constituency.[28]
In a referendum on the future of the monarchy, Diem rigged the poll supervised by his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and received “98.2 percent” of the vote. His American advisers had recommended a more modest winning margin of “60 to 70 percent.” Diem, however, viewed the election as a test of authority.[29] On October 26, 1955, Diem declared the new Republic of Vietnam, with himself as president.[30] The Republic of Vietnam was created largely because of the Eisenhower administration's desire for an anti-communist state in the region.[31] Colonel Edward Lansdale, a CIA officer, became an important advisor to the new president.citation needed
As a wealthy Catholic, Diem was viewed by many ordinary Vietnamese as part of the old elite who had helped the French rule Vietnam. The majority of Vietnamese people were Buddhist, so his attack on the Buddhist community served only to deepen mistrust. Diem's human rights abuses increasingly alienated the population.citation needed
In May, Diem undertook a ten-day state visit to the United States. President Eisenhower pledged his continued support. A parade in New York City was held in his honor. Although Diem was openly praised, in private Secretary of State John Foster Dulles conceded that he had been selected because there were no better alternatives.[32]
The Sino-Soviet split, led to a reduction in the influence of China, which had insisted in 1954 that the Vietminh accept a division of the country. Trường Chinh, North Vietnam's pro-Chinese party first secretary, was demoted and Hanoi authorized communists in South Vietnam to begin a low level insurgency in December 1956.[33] This strategy was referred to as "armed propaganda."[34] Soon afterward, Lê Duẩn, a communist leader who had been working in the South, returned to Hanoi to accept the position of acting first secretary, effectively replacing Trường. Duẩn urged a military line and advocated increased assistance to the insurgency. In response, Diem enacted tough new anti-communist laws.
Four hundred government officials were assassinated in 1957 alone, and the violence gradually increased. While the terror was originally aimed at local government officials, it soon broadened to include other symbols of the status quo, such as schoolteachers, health workers, and agricultural officials.[35] One estimate says that by 1958, 20 percent of South Vietnam's village chiefs had been murdered by the insurgents.[36] The insurgency sought to completely destroy government control in South Vietnam's rural villages and replace it with a shadow government.[37] Finally, in January 1959, the North's Central Committee issued a secret resolution authorizing an "armed struggle." This authorized the southern communist to begin large-scale operations against the South Vietnamese military. However, North Vietnam supplied troops and supplies in earnest, and the infiltration of men and weapons from the north began along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Observing the increasing unpopularity of the Diem regime, on December 12, 1960, Hanoi authorized the creation of the National Liberation Front as a front group for the Vietcong, the communist army in the South.
Successive American administrations, as Robert McNamara and others have noted, overestimated the control that Hanoi had over the NLF.[12] Diem's paranoia, repression, and incompetence progressively angered large segments of the population of South Vietnam.[38] Thus, many maintain that the origins of the anti-government violence were homegrown, rather than inspired by Hanoi.[39] However, as historian Douglas Pike has pointed out, “today, no serious historian would defend the thesis that North Vietnam was not involved in the Vietnam war from the start…. To maintain this thesis today, one would be obliged to deal with the assertions of Northern involvement that have poured out of Hanoi since the end of the war."[40]
When John F. Kennedy won the 1960 U.S. presidential election, one major issue Kennedy raised was whether the Soviet space and missile programs had surpassed those of the U.S. As Kennedy took over, despite warnings from Eisenhower about Laos and Vietnam, Europe and Latin America "loomed larger than Asia on his sights."[41] In his inaugural address, Kennedy made the ambitious pledge to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty."[42]
In June 1961, John F. Kennedy bitterly disagreed with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev when they met in Vienna over key U.S.-Soviet issues. Cold war strategists concluded Southeast Asia would be one of the testing grounds where Soviet forces would test the USA's containment policy—begun during the Truman Administration and solidified by the stalemate resulting from the Korean War.citation needed The Legacy of the Korean War created the idea a limited war.
Although Kennedy stressed long-range missile parity with the Soviets, he was also interested in using special forces for counterinsurgency warfare in Third World countries threatened by communist insurgencies. Although they were originally intended for use behind front lines after a conventional invasion of Europe, Kennedy believed that the guerrilla tactics employed by special forces such as the Green Berets would be effective in a "brush fire" war in Vietnam. He saw British success in using such forces in Malaya as a strategic template.citation needed
The Kennedy administration remained essentially committed to the Cold War foreign policy inherited from the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. In 1961, the USA had 50,000 troops based in Korea, and Kennedy faced a three-part crisis—the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the construction of the Berlin Wall, and a negotiated settlement between the pro-Western government of Laos and the Pathet Lao communist movement[43] These made Kennedy believe that another failure on the part of the United States to gain control and stop communist expansion would fatally damage U.S. credibility with its allies and his own reputation. Kennedy determined to "draw a line in the sand" and prevent a communist victory in Vietnam, saying, "Now we have a problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the place," to James Reston of the New York Times immediately after meeting Khrushchev in Vienna.[44][45] Kennedy increased the number of U.S. military in Vietnam from 800 to 16,300.citation needed
In May 1961, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Saigon and enthusiastically declared Diem the "Winston Churchill of Asia."[46] Asked why he had made the comment, Johnson replied, "Diem's the only boy we got out there."[32] Johnson assured Diem of more aid in molding a fighting force that could resist the communists.
Kennedy's policy toward South Vietnam rested on the assumption that Diem and his forces must ultimately defeat the guerrillas on their own. He was against the deployment of American combat troops and observed that "to introduce U.S. forces in large numbers there today, while it might have an initially favorable military impact, would almost certainly lead to adverse political and, in the long run, adverse military consequences."[47]
The quality of the South Vietnamese military, however, remained poor. Bad leadership, corruption, and political interference all played a part in emasculating the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The frequency of guerrilla attacks rose as the insurgency gathered steam. Hanoi's support for the NLF played a significant role. But South Vietnamese governmental incompetence was at the core of the crisis.[48] Kennedy advisers Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow recommended that U.S. troops be sent to South Vietnam disguised as flood relief workers. Kennedy rejected the idea but increased military assistance yet again. In April 1962, John Kenneth Galbraith warned Kennedy of the "danger we shall replace the French as a colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did."[49] By mid-1962, the number of U.S. military advisers in South Vietnam had risen from 700 to 12,000.citation needed
The Strategic Hamlet Program had been initiated in 1961. This joint U.S.-South Vietnamese program attempted to resettle the rural population into fortified camps. The aim was to isolate the population from the insurgents, provide education and health care, and strengthen the government's hold over the countryside. The Strategic Hamlets, however, were quickly infiltrated by the guerrillas. The peasants resented being uprooted from their ancestral villages. The government refused to undertake land reform, which left farmers paying high rents to a few wealthy landlords. Corruption dogged the program and intensified opposition. Government officials were targeted for assassination. The Strategic Hamlet Program collapsed two years later.citation needed
On July 23, 1962, fourteen nations, including the People's Republic of China, South Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam and the United States, signed an agreement promising the neutrality of Laos.[50]
Some policy-makers in Washington began to conclude that Diem was incapable of defeating the communists and might even make a deal with Ho Chi Minh. He seemed concerned only with fending off coups. As Robert F. Kennedy noted, "Diem wouldn't make even the slightest concessions. He was difficult to reason with …"[51] During the summer of 1963 U.S. officials began discussing the possibility of a regime change. The United States Department of State was generally in favor of encouraging a coup. The Pentagon and CIA were more alert to the destabilizing consequences of such an act and wanted to continue applying pressure for reforms.citation needed
Chief among the proposed changes was the removal of Diem's younger brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nhu controlled the secret police and was seen as the man behind the Buddhist repression. As Diem's most powerful adviser, Nhu had become a hated figure in South Vietnam. His continued influence was unacceptable to the Kennedy administration. Eventually, the administration concluded that Diem was unwilling to change.citation needed
The CIA was in contact with generals planning to remove Diem. They were told that the United States would support such a move. President Diem was overthrown and executed, along with his brother, on November 2, 1963. When he was informed, Maxwell Taylor remembered that Kennedy "rushed from the room with a look of shock and dismay on his face."[52] He had not approved Diem's murder. The U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, invited the coup leaders to the embassy and congratulated them. Ambassador Lodge informed Kennedy that "the prospects now are for a shorter war".[53]
Following the coup, chaos ensued. Hanoi took advantage of the situation and increased its support for the guerrillas. South Vietnam entered a period of extreme political instability, as one military government toppled another in quick succession. Increasingly, each new regime was viewed as a puppet of the Americans; whatever the failings of Diem, his credentials as a nationalist (as Robert McNamara later reflected) had been impeccable.[54]
Kennedy increased the number of U.S. military advisers from 800 to 16,300 to cope with rising guerrilla activity.citation needed The advisers were embedded at every level of the South Vietnamese armed forces. They were, however, almost completely ignorant of the political nature of the insurgency. The insurgency was a political power struggle, in which military engagements were not the main goal.[55] The Kennedy administration sought to refocus U.S. efforts on pacification and "winning over the hearts and minds" of the population. The military leadership in Washington, however, was hostile to any role for U.S. advisers other than conventional troop training.[56] General Paul Harkins, the commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, confidently predicted victory by Christmas 1963.[57] The CIA was less optimistic, however, warning that "the Viet Cong by and large retain de facto control of much of the countryside and have steadily increased the overall intensity of the effort".[58]
In a conversation with Nobel Peace Prize winner and Canadian prime minister Lester B. Pearson, Kennedy sought his advice. "Get out," Pearson replied. "That's a stupid answer," shot back Kennedy. "Everyone knows that. The question is: How do we get out?"[59] Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, just three weeks after Diem.
Kennedy had introduced helicopters to the war and created a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese Air Force, staffed with American pilots. He also sent in the Green Berets. He was succeeded by his vice president, Lyndon B. Johnson, who reaffirmed America's support of South Vietnam. By the end of the year Saigon had received $500 million in military aid.citation needed
Lyndon Johnson, as he took over the presidency after the death of Kennedy, did not consider Vietnam a priority and was more concerned with his "Great Society" and progressive social programs.[60] Johnson had a difficult time with American foreign policy makers, specifically Averill Harriman and Dean Acheson, who to Johnson's mind spoke a different language.[61] Particularly heated was the relationship between the new president and national security advisor McGeorge Bundy. Shortly after the assassination of Kennedy, when Bundy called LBJ on the phone, LBJ responded:
"Goddammit, Bundy. I've told you that when I want you I'll call you."[62]
On November 24, 1963, Johnson brought a small group together to talk with Henry Cabot Lodge, and the new president provided his support to help win the Vietnam war.[63] But the pledge came at a time when Vietnam was deteriorating, especially in places like the Mekong Delta, because of the recent coup against Diem.[64]
The military revolutionary council, meeting in lieu of a strong South Vietnamese leader, was made up of 12 members headed by General Minh—whom Stanley Karnow, a journalist on the ground, later recalled as "a model of lethargy."[65] His regime was overthrown in January 1964 by General Nguyen Khanh. Lodge, frustrated by the end of year, cabled home about Minh: "Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?"[66]
On August 2, 1964, the USS Maddox, on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam's coast, fired upon and damaged several torpedo boats that had been stalking it in the Gulf of Tonkin.[67] A second attack was reported two days later on the USS Turner Joy and Maddox in the same area. The circumstances of the attack were murky. Lyndon Johnson commented to Undersecretary of State George Ball that "those sailors out there may have been shooting at flying fish."[68] The second attack led to retaliatory air strikes, prompted Congress to approve the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and gave the president power to conduct military operations in Southeast Asia without declaring war. In the same month, Johnson pledged that he was not "...committing American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land."[69]
In 2005, however, an NSA declassified report[67] revealed that there was no attack on 4 August. It had already been called into question long before this. "The Gulf of Tonkin incident," writes Louise Gerdes, "is an oft-cited example of the way in which Johnson misled the American people to gain support for his foreign policy in Vietnam."[70] George C. Herring argues, however, that McNamara and the Pentagon "did not knowingly lie about the alleged attacks, but they were obviously in a mood to retaliate and they seem to have selected from the evidence available to them those parts that confirmed what they wanted to believe."[71] Rising from 5,000 in 1959, there were now 100,000 guerrilla fighters in 1964.[55] Some have argued that ten soldiers are needed to deal with every one insurgent.[55] Thus, the total number of U.S. troops in 1964 needed to defeat the insurgents may have exceeded the entire strength of the United States Army.[55]
The National Security Council recommended a three-stage escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. On March 2, 1965, following an attack on a U.S. Marine barracks at Pleiku, Operation Flaming Dart and Operation Rolling Thunder commenced. The bombing campaign, which ultimately lasted three years, was intended to force North Vietnam to cease its support for the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) by threatening to destroy North Vietnam's air defenses and industrial infrastructure. As well, it was aimed at bolstering the morale of the South Vietnamese.[72] Between March 1965 and November 1968, "Rolling Thunder" deluged the north with a million tons of missiles, rockets and bombs.[73] Bombing was not restricted to North Vietnam. Other aerial campaigns, such as Operation Commando Hunt, targeted different parts of the NLF and Vietnam People's Army (VPA) infrastructure. These included the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which ran through Laos and Cambodia. The objective of forcing North Vietnam to stop its support for the NLF, however, was never reached. As one officer noted "this is a political war and it calls for discriminate killing. The best weapon … would be a knife … The worst is an airplane."[74] The Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force Curtis LeMay, however, had long advocated saturation bombing in Vietnam and wrote of the Communists that "we're going to bomb them back into the Stone Age".[75]
Escalation of the Vietnam War officially started on the morning of January 31, 1965, when orders were cut and issued to mobilize the 18th TAC Fighter Squadron from Okinawa to Danang air force base (AFB). A red alert alarm to scramble was sounded at Kadena AFB at 3:00 a.m. F-105s, pilots, and support were deployed from Okinawa and landed in Vietnam that afternoon to join up with other smaller units who had already arrived weeks earlier. Preparations were under way for the first step of Operation Flaming Dart. The mission of Operation Flaming Dart, to cross the Seventeenth Parallel into North Vietnam, had already been planned and was in place before the NLF attack on Pleiku airbase on February 6. On February 7, forty-nine F-105 Thunderchiefs flew out of Danang AFB to targets located in North Vietnam. From this day forward the war was no longer confined to South Vietnam. It took almost an hour to get all forty nine of the F-105's in the air. On that morning, the continuous loud roar of the F-105 engines going down the runway, one following another, was described by the ground crew as a "rolling thunder". At this time the Marines had not landed and Danang AFB was unprotected.citation needed
After several attacks upon them, it was decided that U.S. Air Force bases needed more protection. The South Vietnamese military seemed incapable of providing security. On March 8, 1965, 3,500 United States Marines were dispatched to South Vietnam. This marked the beginning of the American ground war. U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment.[76] Public opinion, however, was based on the premise that Vietnam was part of a global struggle against communism. In a statement similar to that made to the French almost two decades earlier, Ho Chi Minh warned that if the Americans "want to make war for twenty years then we shall make war for twenty years. If they want to make peace, we shall make peace and invite them to afternoon tea."[77] As former First Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co has noted, the primary goal of the war was to reunify Vietnam and secure its independence. The policy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was not to topple other non-communist governments in South East Asia.[78]
The Marines' assignment was defensive. The initial deployment of 3,500 in March was increased to nearly 200,000 by December.[79] The U.S. military had long been schooled in offensive warfare. Regardless of political policies, U.S. commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited to a defensive mission.[79] In May, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces suffered heavy losses at the Battle of Binh Gia. They were again defeated in June, at the Battle of Dong Xoai. Desertion rates were increasing, and morale plummeted. General William Westmoreland informed Admiral Grant Sharp, commander of U.S. Pacific forces, that the situation was critical.[79] He said, "I am convinced that U.S. troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the NLF [National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam]."[80] With this recommendation, Westmoreland was advocating an aggressive departure from America's defensive posture and the sidelining of the South Vietnamese. By ignoring ARVN units, the U.S. commitment became open-ended.[81] Westmoreland outlined a three-point plan to win the war:
"Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. (and other free world) forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.
Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would be concluded when the enemy had been worn down, thrown on the defensive, and driven back from major populated areas.
Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of twelve to eighteen months following Phase 2 would be required for the final destruction of enemy forces remaining in remote base areas."[82]
The plan was approved by Johnson and marked a profound departure from the previous administration's insistence that the government of South Vietnam was responsible for defeating the guerrillas. Westmoreland predicted victory by the end of 1967.[83] Johnson did not, however, communicate this change in strategy to the media. Instead he emphasized continuity.[84] The change in U.S. policy depended on matching the North Vietnamese and the NLF in a contest of attrition and morale. The opponents were locked in a cycle of escalation.[85] The idea that the government of South Vietnam could manage its own affairs was shelved.[85]
Soon the NLF began to engage in small-unit guerrilla warfare, which allowed them to control the pace of the fighting.citation needed
It is widely held that the average U.S. serviceman was nineteen years old, as evidenced by the casual reference in a pop song (19 by Paul Hardcastle); the figure is cited by Lt. Col. Dave Grossman ret. of the Killology Research Group in his 1995 book On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (p. 265). However, it is disputed by the[86] Vietnam Helicopter Flight Crew Network Website, which claims the average age of MOS 11B personnel was 22. This compares with twenty-six years of age for those who participated in World War II. Soldiers served a one year tour of duty. The average age of the US Military men who died in Vietnam was 22.8 years old.[87] The one-year tour of duty deprived units of experienced leadership. As one observer noted "we were not in Vietnam for 10 years, but for one year 10 times."[88] As a result, training programs were shortened. Some NCO's were referred to as "Shake 'N' Bake" to highlight their accelerated training. Unlike soldiers in World War II and Korea, there were no secure rear areas in which to get rest and relaxation (R'n'R). American troops were vulnerable to attack everywhere they went.citation needed
South Vietnam was inundated with manufactured goods. As Stanley Karnow writes, "the main PX, located in the Saigon suburb of Cholon, was only slightly smaller than the New York Bloomingdale's …"[89] The American buildup transformed the economy and had a profound impact on South Vietnamese society. A huge surge in corruption was witnessed. The country was also flooded with civilian specialists from every conceivable field to advise the South Vietnamese government and improve its performance.citation needed
Washington encouraged its SEATO allies to contribute troops. Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines[90] all agreed to send troops. Major allies, however, notably NATO nations, Canada and the United Kingdom, declined Washington's troop requests.[91] The U.S. and its allies mounted complex operations, such as operations Masher, Attleboro, Cedar Falls, and Junction City. However, the communist insurgents remained elusive and demonstrated great tactical flexibility.
Meanwhile, the political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilize somewhat with the coming to power of Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and President Nguyen Van Thieu in 1967. Thieu, mistrustful and indecisive, remained president until 1975.[92] This ended a long series of military juntas that had begun with Diem's assassination. The relative calm allowed the ARVN to collaborate more effectively with its allies and become a better fighting force.
The Johnson administration employed a "policy of minimum candor"[93] in its dealings with the media. Military information officers sought to manage media coverage by emphasizing stories which portrayed progress in the war. Over time, this policy damaged the public trust in official pronouncements. As the media's coverage of the war and that of the Pentagon diverged, a so-called credibility gap developed.[93]
In October 1967 a large anti-war demonstration was held on the steps of the Pentagon. Some protesters were heard to chant, "Hey, hey, LBJ! How many kids did you kill today?" One reason for the increase in the opposition to the Vietnam War was larger draft quotas.citation needed
Having lured General Westmoreland's forces into the hinterland at Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province,[94] in January 1968, the PVA and NLF broke the truce that had traditionally accompanied the Tet (Lunar New Year) holiday. They launched the surprise Tet Offensive in the hope of sparking a national uprising. Over 100 cities were attacked, with assaults on General Westmoreland's headquarters and the U.S. embassy in Saigon.
Although the U.S. and South Vietnamese were initially taken aback by the scale of the urban offensive, they responded quickly and effectively, decimating the ranks of the NLF. In the former capital city of Hue, the combined NLF and NVA troops captured the Imperial Citadel and much of the city, which led to the Battle of Hue. During the interim between the capture of the Citadel and end of the "Battle of Hue", the communist insurgent occupying forces massacred several thousand unarmed Hue civilians (estimates vary up to a high of 6000). After the war, North Vietnamese officials acknowledged that the Tet Offensive had, indeed, caused grave damage to NLF forces. But the offensive had another, unintended consequence.
General Westmoreland had become the public face of the war. He was featured on the cover of Time magazine three times and was named 1965's Man of the Year.[95] Time described him as "the sinewy personification of the American fighting man … (who) directed the historic buildup, drew up the battle plans, and infused the … men under him with his own idealistic view of U.S. aims and responsibilities."[95]
In November 1967 Westmoreland spearheaded a public relations drive for the Johnson administration to bolster flagging public support.[96] In a speech before the National Press Club he said that a point in the war had been reached "where the end comes into view."[97] Thus, the public was shocked and confused when Westmoreland's predictions were trumped by Tet.[96] The American media, which had been largely supportive of U.S. efforts, rounded on the Johnson administration for what had become an increasing credibility gap. Despite its military failure, the Tet Offensive became a political victory and ended the career of President Lyndon B. Johnson, who declined to run for re-election. Johnson's approval rating slumped from 48 to 36 percent.[96] As James Witz noted, Tet "contradicted the claims of progress … made by the Johnson administration and the military."[96] The Tet Offensive was the turning point in America's involvement in the Vietnam War. It had a profound impact on domestic support for the conflict. The offensive constituted an intelligence failure on the scale of Pearl Harbor.[98][99] Journalist Peter Arnett quoted an unnamed officer, saying of Ben Tre that "it became necessary to destroy the village in order to save it".[100] Westmoreland became Chief of Staff of the Army in March, just as all resistance was finally subdued. The move was technically a promotion. However, his position had become untenable because of the offensive and because his request for 200,000 additional troops had been leaked to the media. Westmoreland was succeeded by his deputy Creighton Abrams, a commander less inclined to public media pronouncements.
On May 10, 1968, despite low expectations, peace talks began between the U.S. and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Negotiations stagnated for five months, until Johnson gave orders to halt the bombing of North Vietnam. The Democratic candidate, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, was running against Republican former vice president Richard Nixon. Through an intermediary, Nixon advised Saigon to refuse to participate in the talks until after elections, claiming that he would give them a better deal once elected. Thieu obliged, leaving almost no progress made by the time Johnson left office.
As historian Robert Dallek writes, "Lyndon Johnson's escalation of the war in Vietnam divided Americans into warring camps … cost 30,000 American lives by the time he left office, (and) destroyed Johnson's presidency …"[101] His refusal to send more U.S. troops to Vietnam was Johnson's admission that the war was lost. As Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara noted, "the dangerous illusion of victory by the United States was therefore dead."[102]
During the 1968 presidential election, Richard M. Nixon promised "peace with honor". His plan was to build up the ARVN, so that they could take over the defense of South Vietnam (the Nixon Doctrine). The policy became known as "Vietnamization", a term criticized by Robert K. Brigham for implying that, to that date, only Americans had been dying in the conflict.[103] Vietnamization had much in common with the policies of the Kennedy administration. One important difference, however, remained. While Kennedy insisted that the South Vietnamese fight the war themselves, he attempted to limit the scope of the conflict. In pursuit of a withdrawal strategy, Richard Nixon was prepared to employ a variety of tactics, including widening the war.citation needed
Nixon also pursued negotiations. Theater commander Creighton Abrams shifted to smaller operations, aimed at NLF logistics, with better use of firepower and more cooperation with the ARVN. Nixon also began to pursue détente with the Soviet Union and
