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The Agadir Crisis, also called the Second Moroccan Crisis, was the international tension sparked by the deployment of the German gunboat Panther, to the Moroccan port of Agadir on July 1, 1911.
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Anglo–German tensions were high at this time partly due to German attempts to surpass Britain's naval supremacy. Germany's move was aimed at intimidating France into an alliance with her,[1] as well as enforcing claims for compensation for acceptance of effective French control of the North African kingdom, where France's pre-eminence had been upheld by the 1906 Algeciras Conference following the Tangier Crisis (or First Moroccan Crisis) a year earlier. The move was encouraged by the German press.
In 1911 a rebellion broke out In Morocco against the Sultan, Abdelhafid. By early April 1911 the sultan was besieged in his palace in Fez and the French prepared to send troops to help put down the rebellion under the pretext of protecting European lives and property. The French despatched a flying column at the end of April 1911 and Germany gave approval for the occupation of the city. On 5 June 1911 the Spanish occupied Laraiche and Alcazar. On 1 July 1911 the German gunboat Panther arrived at the port of Agadir. There was an immediate reaction from the French and the British.
During the early summer of 1911 the British government attempted to restrain France from adopting over-hasty measures and to disuade her from sending troops to Fez. The efforts failed but Sir Edward Grey the British Foreign Secretary felt that his hands were tied and that he was forced to support France. In April he wrote: what the French contemplate doing is not wise, but we cannot under our agreement interfere.[2] The British became worried of the Panther's arrival in Morocco. They believed that the Germans meant to turn Agadir into a naval base on the Atlantic.[3] The Royal Navy had a naval base in Gibraltar in the south of Spain. The German Kaiserliche Marine was threatening to over take the Royal Navy as the world's leading naval force. Britain was concerned that the Germans may have a base near the Atlantic and so sent battleships to Morocco in case war broke out. The British supported France as in the First Moroccan Crisis again showing the strength of the Entente Cordiale.
On July 7, the German ambassador in Paris informed the French Government that Germany cherished no territorial aspirations in Morocco and would negotiate for a French protectorate on the basis of "compensation" for Germany in the French Congo region and the safeguarding of her economic interests in Morocco. The German terms, as presented on July 15, while containing an offer to cede the northern part of Kamerun and Togoland, demanded from France the whole of the French Congo from the Sangha River to the sea to which was later added the transfer of France's right to the preemption of the Belgian Congo.
On 21 July David Lloyd George delivered the Mansion House speech in which he declared that national honour was more precious than peace. The speech was interpreted by Germany as a warning that she could not impose an unreasonable settlement on France.[4] The speech read:
"If Britain is treated badly where her interests are vitally affected, as if she is of no account in the cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure."
Franco-German negotiations initiated on July 9 in 1911 toward the Treaty of Fez led (on November 4) to a convention under which Germany accepted France's position in Morocco in return for territory in the French Equatorial African colony of Middle Congo (now the Republic of the Congo). This 275 000 km² territory, known as Neukamerun, became part of the German colony of Kamerun and part of German West Africa, which only lasted briefly until they were captured by the allies in World War I. The area is partly marsh land where sleeping sickness was widespread, although it did give Germany an outlet on the Congo River. Also as part of the treaty, Germany ceded France a small area of territory to the south-east of Fort Lamy, now part of Chad, as shown on this map.
France subsequently established a full protectorate over Morocco (March 30, 1912), ending what remained of the country's formal independence.
Instead of scaring France into turning to Germany, the main result was to increase British fear and hostility and to draw Britain closer to France. British backing for France during the crisis reinforced the Entente between the two countries (and later with Russia as well) and added to Anglo-German estrangement, deepening the divisions which would culminate in World War I. Germans were angered by the land they had received in compensation, which was mostly swamp, and wanted revenge.
Daniel Yergin, in his book, The Prize[5] had argued that it was this incident that led Winston Churchill, then Britain's Home Secretary, to the conclusion that the Royal Navy must convert its power source from coal to oil in order to preserve its supremacy. Until then, the locally abundant coal was favoured over riskier overseas oil (which came mostly from Persia), but the speed and efficiency offered by oil convinced him that "Mastery itself was the prize of the venture". Subsequently, Churchill was asked by Prime Minister Asquith to become First Lord of the Admiralty, which he accepted.
In modern Germany, the Agadir Crisis is still the best known example of gunboat diplomacy.
The crisis lead to Britain and France making a naval agreement where the Royal Navy promised to protect the northern coast of France from German attack.
